INTRODUCTION
During the last fifty years, and particularly the last twenty, innumerable different classifica tions of depressive illness have been proposed, and several disputes are smouldering away between the protagonists of rival schools. Much of this is too well known to need, or bear, repetition. But the conificting claims and pro posals are now so numerous, and methodological problems loom so large, that those who are not intimately involved have increasing difficulty in understanding what is going on; while those who are involved are mostly too intent on deve loping and promoting their own particular schema to review the overall situation in any broader context. This article is an attempt to describe the main elements in a confusing situation, to outline the important problems, and to indicate the areas of agreement that are beginning to emerge, without advocating any particular solution. Zilboorg (i@) once said of the alienists of the last century that â€˜¿ to produce a well-ordered classification almost seems to have become the unspoken ambition of every psychiatrist of industry and promise'. The remark would have been equally applicable to ourselves. The com plexity, and the absurdity, of the present situa tion are vividly illustrated by the fact that almost every classificatory format that is logically possible has been advocated by someone within the last twenty years and some more or less plausible evidence offered in support. There are classifications of depression embracing one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight or nine categories. Indeed RÃ¼mke (1960) recognized thirteen. Some are tiered, others are not. There are also dimensional classifications, with varying numbers of dimensions. Table I gives some idea of the variety of solutions currently in use, or at least on offer, and with a little ingenuity it could easily be expanded to twice the size.
The first question to ask is why there are so many competing classifications and unresolved controversies, and why extensive research has failed to produce any wider agreement. Part of the reason why there has been more argument and debate about the classification of de pressions than about other psychiatric disorders is that they provide a convenient arena for several disputes about the nature and classifica tion of mental illness as a whole: whether mental illnesses are diseases or reaction types; whether they are independent entities or arbitrary concepts; whether they should be classified on the basis of their symptomatology, their aetiology or their pathogenesis; and whether they should be portrayed by a typology or by dimensions. The concept of depressive illness embraces a wide range of different clinical phenomena and spans the historical distinction between psychosis and neurosis, yet at the same time the prevailing mood of sadness, helplessness and hopelessness gives it a common core, a unifying theme. So from the start both detailed subdivision and refusal to subdivide are invested with a certain justification.
The problem is compounded by unresolved philosophical differ ences between the Platonic and Hippocratic traditions, and by a prior failure to agree, or even to consider, what criteria should in principle be required to justify regarding two with the aid of these techniques neither un reliability nor bias can be completely eliminated. Finally, most of the statistical methods used in the analysis of these data make assumptions about distributions which are rarely fulfilled, and the psychologists and psychiatrists who have so enthusiastically employed pre-packaged computer programs to perform complex analyses have often been insufficiently aware of the limitations of the techniques they were using.
Tira PSYCHOTIC-NEUROTIC AND ENDOGENOUS-REACTIVE DISTINCTIONS
The nature of the relationship between â€˜¿ psychotic' and â€˜¿ neurotic' depressions, or alter natively between â€˜¿ endogenous' and â€˜¿ exogenous' or â€˜¿ reactive' depressions, has been at the heart of most of the controversies of the past fifty years. Fundamentally, this has been part of a broader clash between the philosophies of the Meyerian Kendell (1968) There is evidence of a real, but weak, associa tion between the Type A symptom-cluster and both a relative lack of environmental stress and a relatively well-adjusted premorbid personality (Rosenthal and Kierman, 1966 The most enduring controversy of all concerns the nature of the relationship between Type A and Type B depressions.
The historical develop ment of this has been described elsewhere (Kendell, 1968) 
1972).Taken in isolation, thisisstrongevidence
for the existence of at least one valid boundary, or â€˜¿ point of rarity'. However, neitherstudy has yet been replicated by other workers, and attempts to do so for Carney's study have been unsuccessful (Kendell, 1969; Post, 1972) . [Why these attempted replications have failed is itself a contentious matter, but it is likely that the low reliability of clinical ratings, and their susceptibility to bias by â€˜¿ halo effects' is at least part of the explanation.]
LewLc's standpoint Although they were formulated nearly forty years ago, long before the days of structured acknowledging the apparent lack of any valid boundary between Type A and Type B illnesses, yet at the same time acknowledging that the differencesâ€"in symptomatology, premorbid per sonality, treatment response and lifetime course â€"¿ between the two extremes are too extensive to be regarded merely as differences in severity and chronicity. It also has practical utility.
Response to ECT and global outcome at ten months have both been shown to correlate highly with the patient's score on a psychotic/ neuroticdimension, and in general it appears that a patient's position on such an axis provides a better index of outcome than either a Type A/Type B diagnostic dichotomyor any individual symptom (Kendell, 1968; Paykel, Klerman and Prusoff, 1974 analysis, Lewis's views on the classification of depressions are still influential, and the force of his arguments has faded remarkably little with the passage of time. Lewis always remained unconvinced of either the usefulness or the validity of existing classifications, and was particularly suspicious of easy dichotomies. â€˜¿ It is very probable', he said, â€˜¿ that all the tables and classifications in terms of symptoms are nothing more than attempts to distinguish between acute and chronic, mild and severe; and where two categories only are presented, the oneâ€"manic depressiveâ€"gives the characteristics of acute, severe depression, the other of chronic mild depression ' (Lewis, 1938) . For this reason he is often thought to have believed, and taught, that all depressive illness was essentially the same, but this was not really so. As he observed else where in that same article, â€˜¿ probablythere are genuine differences between cases of mainly hereditary causation and those in which en vironmental causes predominate, possibly also between cases with different kinds of hereditary causation, but the clinical differences..
. do not at present serve to distinguish them'. Although he undoubtedly regarded existing classffications as unhelpful, it is clear from this, and from his teaching, that he accepted that the aetiology as well as the phenomenology of depressive illnesses was heterogeneous, and that ultimately sub division would be desirable.
Kendell's p@ychotic/neuroticcontinuum
This is also true that a two-dimensional model would provide more information than a unidimensional one, though severity and endogenous/reactive might well be a more useful pair of dimensions than neuroticism and psychoticism. However, similar arguments could be used to maintain that three dimensions are needed rather than two; and the disadvantages of increasing complexity have always to be offset against the advantages of fuller description. Even if one accepts the decision to employ dimensions in place of categories, the optimum number of dimensions is really still unclear. Whether it should be one, two, three or four is likely to depend on the purpose for which the classification is intended; and, as was pointed out above, once a decision has been reached to use a dimensional system it makes little sense to consider depressive illnesses in isolation.
Foulds' hierarchy
In day-to-day practice the diagnosis of neurotic (Type B) depression tends to be made by exclusion of Type A depression. Type A depression is diagnosed whenever its charac teristic features are present, but Type B is characterized by the absence of Type A features rather than by the presence of pathognomonic features of its own. Foulds (i@7@) has pointed out that this is a hierarchical relationship, and has shown that the pattern of symptom ratings derived from the self-report questionnaire responses of depressed patients fit a hierarchy model. As the only requirements of his model are that all patients with what he calls â€˜¿ delusions of contrition' should also be depressed, and that there should be other patients who are simply depressed without having delusions, this is not unexpected. However, Foulds also claims that this is merely one facet of a more elaborate hierarchy, embracing the whole gamut of psychotic and neurotic symptomatology and all varieties of functional illness in a single four tiered system; and the evidence he presents in support, derived from the questionnaire re sponses of several hundred patients, is quite strong (Foulds and Bedford, 1975 
Factor analytic studies
Until recently most attempts to solve our classification problems by the statistical analysis of clinical data were based on factor analysis (or principalcomponent analysis). Often this was on the fallaciousassumption that the number of factors or components obtained indicated the number of subpopulations present, and that each factor represented a distinct group of patients. In fact, as Torgerson (1968) and others have pointed out, neither of these assump tions is justified. Factors and principal com ponents are both expressions of relationships between attributes, whereas classification is concerned with relationships between indi viduals, and it is never justifiable to draw conclusions about the latter simply from a study of the former. Partly for this reason, and partly because of the wide variation between the results of different analyses, the forty or so factorial studies of depressive symptomatology that have been performed in the last twenty years leave us little the wiser. Some of these have been reviewed previously by Mendels and Cochrane (1968) , Costello (i@7o) or Frank (i@7@).The six studiesconsideredby Costello all produced a bipolar factor with positive loadings on clinical items traditionally asso ciated with Type A depression and negative loadings on items associated with Type B depression.
However, there was little con sistency in the loadings obtained by individual items, and only one symptomâ€"retardation obtained a significant positive loading in all six. Mendels and Cochrane were rather more impressed by the level of agreement between the seven studies they considered, but, as Costello has pointed out, this is partly because they did not consider the full range of items covered in them.
Part of thisvariationin outcome is due to obvious procedural differences. Some authors used questionnaire responses, others clinical ratings; some restricted themselves to the current mental state, others included per sonality ratings and elements of past history and aetiology as well; some rotated their factors, others did not, and some allowed them to become oblique and produced second order factors as well. Most studies produced at least two significant factors, and one of these could usually be identified either with the traditional concept of endogenous or psychotic (Type A) depression or with the contrast between the Type A and Type B stereotypes. Perhaps the most frequent result was for the first factor to be a general factor, often interpreted as â€˜¿ endo genous' depression, but probably better re garded as representing severity of illness, and for the second to be a bipolar factor delineating the psychotic/neurotic or endogenous/reactive dimension. The results obtained by Hamilton (1967) are as representative as any, and based on betterdata and a sounder understanding of the statistical principles involved than most.
INDIVIDUAL TYPOLOGIES AND CIA5sIFIcA'r,oNs

Overall's typologp
Overall and his colleagues subjected the ratings of i 6o depressives on the 16 scales of their Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale to an elaborate form of factor analysis and by this means identified â€˜¿ three distinctive profile clusters' (Overall, Hollister, Johnson and Pen nington, 1966) . The first and largest of these, anxious-tense depression, consisted of patients who were anxious as well as depressedand generally had clinical diagnoses of neurotic or reactive depression. The second, hostile depression, con sisted of patients who were notably irritable, and often anxious and agitated as well; and the third and smallest group, retarded depression, corresponded fairly well with the classical Type A stereotype.
Subsequently the authors assigned a group of 77 depressed men in a trialcomparing the antidepressant activity of imipramine and thioridazine to whichever of thesethreeprofiles they most resembled. Although there was no difference between the two drugs overall, they were able to show that the anxious-tense group
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responded significantly better to thioridazine, whereas the retarded group responded signi ficantly better to imipramine. Despite this promising start,however, no attempt seems to have been made to explore the characteristics of the three groups any further.
Paykel's typolog,
This contains four categoriesâ€"psychotic de pressives, anxious depressives, hostile depressives and young depressiveswith personality disorder. These four groups were the product of a cluster analysis of ratings from 165 patients drawn from a variety of differenttreatment settings in a single urban areaâ€"an out-patient clinic, a day hospital and several different in-patient units (Paykel, 1971) . Semi-structured inter viewing methods were used, and ratings of previous history, life stress and premorbid neuroticism were included as well as clinical symptoms. The psychotic cluster, the smallest of the four, corresponded fairly well with the traditional Type A stereotypeâ€"middle-aged patients with severe illnesses, sometimes delu sional, and good premorbid adjustment.
The anxious group were also elderly and quite deeply depressed, but had a high incidence of previous illnesses and high neuroticism scores as well as prominent anxiety. The third and fourth groups were both younger and less severely depressed, the former with marked hostility, the latter with more or less prominent underlying personality disorders. Subsequently, a partial validation of the typology was pro vided by the demonstration, in a population of 85 depressed women, that there were significant differences in response to amitriptyline between the four groups, the anxious depressives having the worst response (Paykel, 1972) .
The care taken to obtain a representative sample of patients, and reliable ratings on them, and the use of cluster analysis rather than factoranalysis, mark thisstudy out as a signi ficant methodological advance on most of its predecessors. There are also reassuring simi larities between the first three types and Overall's retarded, anxious-tense, and hostile depressions, and between the fourth â€˜¿ young depressives with personality disorder' group and Hamilton and White's (1959) psychopathic depression.
Even so, the validity of the classifi cation is not yet adequately established. No one has yet produced the same clusters inde pendently from other data, and the similarity to Overall's typology is more apparent than real. At all events, when the 8@ patients in the amitriptyline trial referred to above were also assigned, by computer, to Overall's three categories on the basis of their Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale profiles, the relationship between the two classifications was weak, and only two of Paykel's sixteen psychotic depressives were assigned to Overall's retarded depression group. Moreover, no significant differences in outcome emerged between the four groupings in a ten-month follow-up of a group of 191 patients, whereas the same patients' scores on an endogenous-neurotic dimension did predict outcome successfully (Paykel, Klerman and Prusoff, 1974) .
Involutional melancholia
This syndrome has featured in most textbooks and classifications ever since Kraepein in the fifth edition of his Lehrbuch described a group of involutional psychoses distinct from manic depressive insanity and dementia praecox. In the last thirty years, however, interest in the concept has waned, and it is now generally agreed that involutional melancholia is not an independent entity and that the term has out lived its usefulness. (Prien, Klett and Caffey, 1974 ). Leonhard's distinction has had to be amended in one respect. Patients with unipolar mania are rare, and their first degree relatives suffer not from mania alone but from bipolar illness or unipolar depression. For this and other reasons thereisgeneral agreementthatrecurrent mania is best regarded as bipolar illness which has not yet manifested its first episode of depression. In otherwords, the importantdistinction is not whether the illness manifests itself in two forms or one,but whetheror not manic episodes ever occur.
The St Louis Classification
The most important feature of this classifica tion is the distinction it draws between primary and secondaryaffective disorders. The former are depressive or manic illnesses which are not preceded chronologically by any other psychia tric disturbance, the latter illnesses which are eitherpreceded by another psychiatric illness (anxiety neurosis, schizophrenia, alcoholism, homosexuality, antisocial personality disorder, etc), whether or not itstill persists, or accom panied by a life-threatening or incapacitating physical illness (Robins, Munoz, Martin and Gentry, 1972 ). Primary affective disorders are then subdivided into umpolar and bipolar types, theformerconsisting ofdepressive illnesses only, the latter of depression and mania combined, and unipolar illnesses are subdivided further into â€˜¿ depressionspectrum disease' and â€˜¿ pure depressive disease'.
The primary/secondary distinction has several attractions. It can be made fairly reliably on the basis of a simple chronological distinction, and unambiguous operational criteria are available for both categories (Feighner, Robins, Guze, general practice, it has become clear that classical involutional melancholia is only one elementin a spectrumofinvolutional illnesses, and that the life-long prognosis of involutional depressions is little different from that of other depressions starting earlier or later in life.
Unipolar and bipolar illness
The proposal to divide manic-depressive illness into separate bipolar (alternating mania and depression) and unipolar(recurrent de pression or recurrent mania) psychoses was first made by Leonhard @ but it was Angst (1966) and Perris (1966) who first produced convincing evidence in support of the distinc tion.Perris studied138 patients with at least one episode of depression and one of mania (bipolar illness), 139 patients with at least three episodes of depression without mania (unipolar depression), and I 7 patients with at least three episodes of mania without depression (unipolar mania). He was able to show that bipolar illness started on average fifteen years earlier than unipolar depression and recurred more frequently. Individual episodes of illness were shorter, and the morbidity risk in first degree relatives was higher. There were also personality differences between the two, the bipolar patients tending to be warm, energetic and extraverted, the unipolar patients retiring, tenseand anxious. Moreover,both bred true. The first-degree relatives of bipolar patients had bipolar illnesses and the relatives of unipolar depressives unipolar illnesses.
Most of thesefindings have sincebeen con finned, though it is apparent that the distinction between the two isnot quiteso neat as Perris originally suggested. In particular, although the risk of bipolar illness in the relatives of unipolar patients does seem to be little, if at all, higher than that in the general population, the relatives ofbipolar patients appeartohave a higherrisk of developing unipolar illness than bipolar ill ness (e.g. Angst, 1966 provides a convenient means of sidetracking the need to distinguish between psychotic and neurotic, or endogenous and reactive, de pressions and all the practical difficulties and semantic confusion this involves. It also elimi nates all those depressions whose symptoms and antecedents are complicated and obscured by alcoholism, physical illness and lifelong per sonality disorder. As a research strategy it has a great deal to commend it. But no evidence has been offered to suggest that it is anything more than a convenient strategy. Affective illnesses commonly develop for the first time in middle or old age and there is no good reason to assume that those which develop in people who earlier in life had episodes of anxiety, or drinking problems, are necessarily different from those which develop in other people. And to avoid asking whether, or to what extent, an illness is endogenous or reactive, involves forfeiting the valuable therapeutic and prognostic correlates of that dimension.
The subdivision into â€˜¿ depressionspectrum disease' and â€˜¿ pure depressive disease' is based on observed differences in family history between patients developing their first depressive illness before and after the age of 40. Those who become ill before the age of 40 (depression spectrum disease) are mostly women, and their first-degree relatives have a high incidence of psychiatric illness. In female relatives this is mainly depression, but in men alcoholism or sociopathy predominate.
In those who first become ill after the age of 40 (pure depressive disease) there is no excess of women, and the incidence of psychiatric illness in first-degree relatives is lower. Moreover, this consists almost entirely of depressive illness with no more alcoholism and sociopathy than in the general population (Winokur, 1974; Winokur, Cadoret, Baker and Dorzab, 1975 This asymmetrical relationship between the two classical syndromes has been expressed in a number of different ways. Mendels and Cochrane (1968) suggested that Type A was depressive illness in pure culture and Type B depression mixed and diluted with other syndromesâ€"'the so-called endogenous factor might represent the core of depressive symp tomatology, whereas the clinical features of the reactive factor may represent phenomenological manifestations of psychiatric disorders other than depression which â€oe¿ contaminateâ€• the de pression syndrome'. Kiloh suggested that Type A was a disease entity with a biological basis but Type B simply one facetof the broad spectrum of neurotic reactions to stress â€˜¿ psychotic or endogenous depression is a con dition with a restricted range of clinical mani festations, consistent with an imputed genetic or biochemical basis, whilstso-called neurotic depression is a diffuse entity encompassing some of theways in which the patient utilizes his defence mechanisms to cope with his own neuroticism and concurrent environmental stress' (Kiloh, Andrews, Neilson and Bianchi, 1972 Probably the most important area of emerging agreement is Leonhard's distinction between unipolar and bipolar illness. Of all the new classifications proposed in the last twenty years this is unique in having come into widespread use outside the walls of its author's own institu tion. Good fortune has played some part in this. The terms were introduced at a time when research laboratories throughout the world were just starting to investigate the biological basis of manic-depressive illness and the mode of action and efficacy of lithium salts, and it was obviously sensible for them to distinguish between patients with and without a history of mania in case they turned out to be different. Even so, the distinction would never have been widely adopted if the evidence presented by Angst and Perris had not been strong, if others had not been able to confirm their findings, and, equally important,ifthe grounds on which the distinc tion was based had not been clearly defined and easy to apply. At the present time there is little doubt that the distinction is sensible and valuable, despite the fact that agreement has not yet been reached on the characteristics of the patients to whom the distinction should be applied. [Angst and Penis apply the unipolar/ bipolar distinction only to patients whom they consider to have recurrent endogenous affective psychoses; Winokur and his colleagues apply it to all patients meeting their criteria for primary affective disorder; and Prien and his colla borators applied it to all patients with recurrent hospital admissions for affective illnesses of any kind.] Whether the importance of the distinction will grow or diminish as time goes on will depend on whether important biochemical or therapeutic differences are found between the depressive phases of the two.
In the last twenty years countless attempts have been made to improve on the intuitive classifications of the past by subjecting clinical ratings, systematically collected from large populations of patients, to various forms of multivariate analysis. The result, as we have seen, has been disappointing.
We now have more, not fewer, competing classifications than we had a generation ago, and in those areas where a consensus has emerged multivariate analysis has not played a crucial role. It is important for us to consider, therefore, how likely we are to do better in the future. There is no doubt that much of the work done in the past has been marred by serious methodological deficiencies. The patients were not represen tative, the reliability of the ratings was too low, the wrong statistical methods were used, or the wrong conclusions drawn from them. But even if these deficiencies were to be remedied, and even if we assume that as time goes on we will improve the reliability of our ratings a little further and that more refined statistical tech niques will become available to us, it is difficult to feel eonfldent that a clear-cut solution capable of commanding widespread assent is likely to emerge. The attempt to resolve our classification problems by the statistical analysis of clinical data has failed up to now and may well continue to do so. We may have to live with our uncertainties and our disagreements until we understand enough about the physio logical or psychological substrate of depression to construct a new classification on that basis.
For the foreseeable future, therefore, different workers are going to be using different classifica tions, and we must reconcile ourselves to this. We must, however, insist that each of these classifications is accompanied by unambiguous operational criteria of the terms employed, so that anyone can use them and can repeat other people's work if they wish to. We must also pay more attention than we have in the past to validity. Before we accept a new treatment we require evidence that it is effective, and that its effectiveness compares favourably with existing remedies. And if it proves more effective than its predecessors they are soon discarded. It is time we started to do the same for classifications. Advocates of novel classifications should be expectedtoprovideevidence notonlythattheir new groupingsare valid but also that they compare favourably with existing classifications, by demonstrating, for example, that they correlate more highly with treatment response or eventual outcome.And ifthenew classification is indeed superioritspredecessors should be discarded.
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